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Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg, 
 
Imperfect Knowledge Economics: 
Exchange Rates and Risk 
 
by Edmund S. Phelps* 
 
Much has been written by historians and sociologists as well as business 
commentators about the modern economy – the kind that supplanted the 
traditional economy in several nations in the nineteenth century and many more 
in the latter half of the twentieth century. The pre-capitalist system dominated 
by the self-employed and the self-financed gave way to finance capitalism. To 
call this a “great transformation” was no overstatement. 
 
A traditional economy is one of routine. In the usual illustrative example, 
rural folk periodically exchange their produce for the goods of the town. The 
sole disturbances are not of their doing and are beyond their control – rainfall, 
temperature, and other exogenous shocks. This was the economy modeled in the 
neoclassical theory of economic equilibrium from Ricardo and Böhm-Bawerk to 
Walras and Samuelson. It is also the economy described in the subsequent 
stochastic models of “rational expectations equilibrium” in the face of shocks 
that were pioneered by Arrow, Samuelson, Muth, and Lucas. 
 
The modern economy is marked by the feasibility of endogenous change. 
Modernization opens the door for individuals to engage in novel activity – most 
importantly, the financing, developing and marketing of new products and 
methods. Furthermore, such innovations, when successful in the marketplace, 
have unforeseen effects on production possibilities, prices, the differentiation of 
goods and the specialization of work. 
 
For decades, economics students have quietly asked themselves whether 
the equilibrium theory of the classroom is adequate for modeling the modern 
economy. It is one thing to know the prices at hand, another to know all prices 
far and wide and over the whole future and for every state of the world that 
shocks might land the economy in. Equilibrium theory implicitly takes the 
mechanisms that constitute the economy to be completely known: participants 
have a full understanding of how this organism works, so everyone knows the 
probability distribution of outcomes to expect in this or that state. This in turn 
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implies that everyone knows this understanding to be common knowledge, so 
there is no diversity of views that would have to be guessed at in estimating 
what others intend to do. 
 
History records a small band of economists who have called attention to 
points of dissonance between the modern economy and equilibrium theory, 
including the theory of rational expectations equilibrium, in which expectations 
(and thus prices) are taken to be appropriate for equilibrium in each possible 
current state.
1 
In fact the growing perception, starting from the turn of the 
century, that the new modern economies were generally out of equilibrium, 
sometimes frighteningly so, is one of the hallmarks of twentieth century 
thought. 
 
The great interwar theorist at Chicago, Frank Knight, pondering the arrival 
of capitalism, took the unprecedented position in his 1921 classic Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit that virtually all business decisions other than the routine 
ones are to an appreciable extent a step into the unknown. The possible 
outcomes might have probabilities but those probabilities were unknown, or 
“unmeasurable” – the radical sort of uncertainty now called “Knightian 
uncertainty.” Viewing from London and Cambridge a similarly modern 
economy, John Maynard Keynes proposed in his 1921 Treatise on Probability a 
rewrite of probability theory that would take account of radical uncertainty. His 
1936 General Theory was an attempt to overthrow equilibrium theory. In 
subsequent years, economists from Vienna to Copenhagen critiqued “perfect 
foresight” and its generalization, now known as rational expectations 
equilibrium.
2





Trained professionals in that decade had a sense of what this anti-
equilibrium literature was getting at. We thought that, empirically, equilibrium 
theory would not work well. For one thing, the economies (at least the world 
economy) we lived in had become too rich for equilibrium theory to fit at all 
well: forming correct expectations about a sole experiment, such as a lower 
price or a new variation on a product, is one thing but forming expectations 
when most or all firms are simultaneously experimenting is qualitatively 
different. For another thing, these economies were not really fluctuating around 
the stationary state or steady-growth path of neoclassical theory; they were 
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  I am thinking of the game theorists Morgenstern (1949) and Zeuthen (1955). 
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  Ambiguity and vagueness were introduced by Ellsberg (1961) and Fellner (1961), personal knowledge by 
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constantly evolving in their structure and were changing too fast for economic 
relationships (between prices and quantities, for example) to have the durability 





Yet, a few years later, the community of macroeconomists, far from 
distancing themselves farther and farther from equilibrium theory, proceeded 
almost unanimously to embrace the rational expectations models of business 
activity introduced in the early 1970s. Keynes and the Cantabridgians were out. 
Hayek and the Austrians were out. So was Spiethoff and his German school. 
 
 
This marvelous book by Frydman and Goldberg documents in its first two 
chapters invaluable insights of the “early modern” theory of capitalism that 
were lost when the profession endorsed rational expectations equilibrium. And 
it exposes to the light the arguments offered by the advocates of the premise of 
rational expectations. There can’t be many readers who won’t be fascinated by 
this story. In letting the two sides speak in their own carefully chosen words, the 
authors allow the expressed points of disagreement to come into sharp focus. 
 
These chapters, however, soon probe to a deeper level. It isn’t just that the 
postulate of rational expectations is unrealistic in the same way that the 
postulate of rational choice is conceded to be unrealistic. We agree to work with 
rational choice in spite of its limitations, so why not rational expectations too? 
The primary issue is not an empirical one. Even if no firms at the current time 
were actually venturing a new price list, conceiving a new way to cut costs, 
devising new financial vehicles, contemplating a new product, and so forth, 
there would still be a problem: rational expectations equilibrium theory as an 
element of our models of the modern sort of economies contradicts the very 
essence of an economy in which economic actors are free to exercise their 
“creativity” by venturing to do something innovative. 
 
The authors argue that if we aspire to build models that apply to modern 
economies – economies whose central functioning is the manufacture of change 
through their innovative activity and their adoption and mastery of the 
innovations made available – it is contradictory to adopt the rational 
expectations postulate that whatever change takes place in the future is already 
knowable and known in the present: that the economic change to be experienced 
is in a sense predetermined. Yet contemporary model builders embracing 
rational expectations have been undeterred or unaware of the contradiction: they 
either specify that there is no change in the world (the world they would 
describe with their models) or that whatever process of change is going on in 
the world can be incorporated in their models in a fully predetermined way. 
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mine (Phelps, 2006a). 
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This criticism is not a narrow point that would be straightforward to 
remedy. The authors are not referring to the fact that the archetypal models of 
an economy enjoying rational expectations equilibrium have built into them an 
invariant trend-growth path to which the economy is constantly returning (as 
described by some transition dynamics). It is obvious that such a trend path is 
predetermined; the possibilities and probabilities are “prespecified” (in the 
authors’ preferred term). The authors’ argument is broader than that. If a 
rational expectations model supposed instead that the future was governed by a 
probabilistic linear birth process, so the model has no trend path to which the 
economy is tethered, there is still a fundamental predeterminacy: the possible 
states at a given future date are all known already and there is at present a 
calculable probability, conditional on the present state, of each such future 
state’s occurrence. In this model too, then, there is implicitly no possibility for 
the actors in the economy to create something unforeseeable, surprising, 
genuinely innovative. Thus, there is a methodological choice: to model on the 
premise of fully pre-specified future possibilities, which rational expectations 
requires, or to model an economy capable of endogenous change, which the 
modern economy is. 
 
  
A recent case in point is the state-of-the-art model of the real business cycle 
type, where recognition is given to the accepted idea that opportunities are 
rosier at some times than others – the notion of “regimes” in which there are 
outsize rates of return in prospect for investment.
5
 At first blush this construct 
appears to capture an economy undergoing the occasional boom and the 
occasional slump at unpredictable times and having a future that feels not fully 
predetermined – and all this without sacrificing the precision of rational 
expectations equilibrium. The truth is, however, that this is a highly mechanical 
apparatus implying a finite number of states at any future date and imputing to 
each a calculable probability conditional on the economy’s present state. 
 
An older case of equilibrium theory in macroeconomics is Joseph 
Schumpeter’s great 1911 work Theory of Economic Development. He saw the 
need to go beyond the Spiethoff-Cassel model, in which no entrepreneur 
appears and none is needed, only the occasional discovery of an exogenous 
scientist or explorer. Forced to choose whether to remain with the equilibrium 
perspective of his idol Walras or instead to regard entrepreneurs as creators in 
their own – figures creating the future – Schumpeter clung to the equilibrium 
perspective. The Schumpeterian entrepreneurs were merely the vessels the 
economy needs to carry out the commercial innovations made possible by the 
technology. The stock of undeveloped innovations were all “in the air,” each 
waiting for one of Schumpeter’s “entrepreneurs” to find it convenient to take on 
its financing, developing, and marketing. The rate of return of every project was 
known, at any rate to the experienced banker. The Schumpeterian model makes 
determinate (at least probabilistically) the rate of innovative activity and the 
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time path of productivity – as if the creativity is all science and no commerce.  
 
In contrast, to elaborate on earlier remarks, Keynes saw the rate of return 
as quite unknown and the demand for investment funds as driven by 
entrepreneurs’ “animal spirits.” Hayek saw that every participant has little or no 
knowledge of how the economy works as a whole, contrary to rational 
expectations; that a participant is apt to have only some highly specialized 
knowledge about his or her industry, which is itself apt to be quite specialized; 
that in some cases it is so deep as to be “private knowledge;” and that such 
knowledge may permit a creative person to conceive some new business 
strategy or new business product that is not in the air, not already known by all. 
In the struggle between these two worldviews, Keynes and Hayek were right but 




As the rational expectations view has come under increasing suspicion, 
parts of the profession have jumped to the conclusion that the problem is 
“sticky” prices or some sort of rote behavior or “irrational exuberance” in asset 
prices or all of these. What Keynes and Hayek in the 1930s and Phelps in the 
1960s understood is that there may be a problem with expectational equilibrium 
and it need not be sticky prices or irrationality but mainly the ever-imperfect 
knowledge of the structure of the economy and the attempt of purposeful market 





If rational expectations equilibrium and its doppelganger predeterminacy must 
be regarded as inapplicable to the modern economy, the profession needs 
embark on its own voyage of discovery. The present book is devoted to setting 
out a fresh approach, one that is neither rational-expectationist nor behavioralist. 
 
The authors of this book show that if we want to do coherent 
macroeconomic theorizing about a modern economy we are going to have to 
allow in our models for non-routine decision making and unforeseeable changes 
in the social context within which individuals make decisions. How do we build 
such a theory for modern economies? 
 
The authors devote most of the book to developing such a theory, which 
they dub “imperfect knowledge economics.” This economics builds in 
mathematical microfoundations of aggregate outcomes and yet it allows for 
non-routine ways in which market participants might alter the way they deploy 
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  I would add that in relatively recent work (Phelps, 1994) I simply treat every shock as de novo, so the state 
it brings was fully unanticipated. Obviously this treatment is at odds with rational expectations. However, I 
regard the implications of that model to fit more closely with the behavior of national economies than do the 
models that invoke a stochastic stationary state with no room for parametric shifts. 
7
  Leijonhufvud (1968) also attributes this view to Keynes, and he identifies himself with that view. I should 
add that, although I participated in the New Keynesian venture in the 1970s to rewrite Keynesian economy on 
the basis of rational expectations coupled with non-synchronous wage/price setting, my heart was always 
with the model in which wages and prices were continually being revised. 
 7
resources. The remarkable feature of these imperfect knowledge models is that, 
while they do not assume away non-routine activities, they nevertheless 
generate implications that allow an economist to compare empirically the 
performance of alternative explanations of outcomes. 
 
How is this done? The key point is that imperfect knowledge economics 
focuses on change and looks for qualitative regularities, not quantitative ones. 
The authors’ models impose qualitative restrictions on the way forecasting 
strategies are revised. While placing enough structure on an economist’s model, 
these restrictions are general enough to be compatible with a myriad of ways in 
which market participants might revise their views of the future. Moreover, 
these restrictions recognize that sharp forecasts of what an individual will do 
are beyond the reach of any economic analysis of modern economies. 
 
This approach resolves Knight’s and Keynes’s problem of how to 
reconcile the use of probability theory in modeling decisions under uncertainty. 
As Knight and Keynes recognized, neither the actors nor the economist-modeler 
know the probability distribution of outcomes. The key innovation of the 
authors is to model the change across time in these distributions and in a purely 
qualitative way (the authors refer to these as “partially predetermining 
restrictions”) rather than to model the probability distribution at each point in 
time. 
 
The three-decade-long debate between the Neoclassical and “Keynesian” 
schools over whether prices are sticky or flexible appears to be a mere 
distraction. In the context of the foreign exchange market, the authors show that, 
with incomplete knowledge, long swings in real exchange rates do not depend 
on whether prices are sticky or flexible. Rather, they arise from the imperfection 
of knowledge concerning the structure of the economy and market participants’ 
attempts to cope with it. Moreover, in contrast to recently fashionable 
behavioral models, the authors’ explanation of swings does not abandon the 
long tradition in economics that individuals behave in largely rational, or 
reasonable, ways. 
 
Remarkably, once the authors allow for imperfect knowledge on how 
fundamentals influence the exchange rate, long swings can arise even if all 
market participants’ diverse forecasting strategies depend solely on the 
macroeconomic fundamentals. It would not be suprising, therefore, if it is later 
found that a similar mechanism generates swings in overall business activity. 
(This possibility suggests that if modified by the authors’ imperfect knowledge 
framework, my models of “structural slumps” would generate not a monotone 
shift from the initial steady state to the new one but rather a cyclical transition.) 
 
In the conventional conception, as I pointed out above, market outcomes 
are mere vibration around a steady state path. Swings are viewed as anomalous 
and puzzling. Once imperfect knowledge is placed at the center of the analysis, 
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swings arise as part of the discovery process of how prices are related to 
macroeconomic fundamentals.  
 
The authors’ imperfect knowledge economics sees the modern economy 
as possessing bounded instability around historical benchmark values, which 
themselves may be evolving over time. The importance of historical 
benchmarks in characterizing individual behavior and aggregate outcomes was 
emphasized by almost all important early modern economists: Wicksell, 
Keynes, and Tobin, who built on this in his work on “behavior toward risk.” (I 
imagine this view will be found to link well to my own work on movements of 
the medium-term natural unemployment rate.) 
 
Another hallmark of the imperfect knowledge view is its qualification of 
fixed policy rules. The necessary point is that the optimum rule is not the same 
from one structure of the economy to another. As with the rest of 
macroeconomics, the issues have to be rethought in a way that makes the ever-
imperfect knowledge of market participants and policymakers an integral part of 
the analysis. 
 
I had the great good fortune in the 1960s to initiate the profession’s work 
on plausible microfoundations for macroeconomic modeling, taking into 
account the knowledge and the information that the micro-actors could 
reasonably be supposed to have –a revolutionary movement it seems. 
Unfortunately, the rational expectations models, appearing in the 1970s, 
sidestepped the problem of expectations formation under uncertainty by blithely 
supposing that the model’s actors (tellingly dubbed “agents”) knew the 
“correct” model and the correct model was the analyst’s model – whatever that 
model might be that day. The stampede toward “rational expectations,” widely 
called a “revolution” though it was only a generalization of the neoclassical idea 
of equilibrium, derailed the expectations-driven model building that had just left 
the station. In the end, this way of modeling has not illuminated how the world 
economy works. Happily for me and I believe for the profession of economics, 
this deeply original and important book gives signs of bringing us back on track 
– on a road toward an economics possessing a genuine microfoundation and at 
the same time a capacity to illuminate some of the many aspects of the modern 




Graciana del Castillo, 
 
Rebuilding War-torn States: 
The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction 
 
by Edmund S. Phelps* 
 
A wave of civil war and cross-border conflict has swept over numerous 
countries in the past two decades: Afghanistan, Kosovo, El Salvador, Iraq, and 
others in Africa and Asia. It could have been expected that, when the conflict 
stopped, these countries would have found their footing again and set about to 
make up the lost ground. In fact, economic development has still not restarted in 
most of these war-torn countries. Many of them have regressed to a lower stage 
of development than they had attained before their conflicts. This state of affairs 
presents dangers to the rest of the world but it must be understood before it can 
be addressed with any prospect of success. 
 
That the post-conflict countries, generally speaking, have not yet returned 
to visible development might be seen by some as an indication that these 
countries are permanently resistant to development – or have become so as a 
result of their conflicts. We know, however, that development has proved 
widely possible in spite of difficulties: on every continent we find countries that 
overcame enough hurdles for development to have begun. Indeed, some of the 
war-torn countries had shown some development prior to their conflicts. Rather 
than jump to the conclusion that most war-torn countries are barren of 
development possibilities, we might better look to see whether development has 
not resumed because some key pre-conditions for development have not been 
satisfied. 
 
It could well be that governmental efforts at “reconstruction” in the war-
torn countries have failed to address and even to identify some pre-conditions 
that have been missing in the aftermath of the conflicts. It is inevitable that 
governments will not get right all the conditions that a resumption of 
development would require. Reconstruction aid might be shaped by a 
conceptual framework for thinking about development and that framework is 
inadequate to the task – in all less developed countries and particularly in the 
war-torn countries. 
 
The classical theory of development has undoubtedly been influential in 
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shaping reconstruction aid, in part because of its outstanding simplicity. In this 
theory, development will self-start in a country once it undertakes the task of 
establishing property rights and the more difficult task of establishing a “rule” 
of law, which the economy’s participants can depend on. Then private interests 
can safely form enterprises and invest in the kinds of business for which they 
are best suited. By doing so, they will earn a living according to their human 
capital and the amount of land and other resources available to them.  
 
Unfortunately, the classical perspective on development does not fully 
comprehend the richness of what development is – or could be. In the classical 
theory, leisure is better than work. Passive consuming is the final purpose of 
economic life. In any adequate view of what a rich development means, there is 
far more to development than that. 
 
To set up a well-aimed reconstruction program it is necessary to have in 
mind a clear idea of what a rich development is and what it requires. The central 
elements in any such conception of development include mental stimulation, 
work to become engaged in, personal growth from meeting opportunities and 
challenges, the excitement of the new and the tingle of uncertainty. In my 
terminology, this means an economic dynamism – an economy of 
innovativeness in directions believed to be profitable. Of course, economic 
justice requires ample inclusion in this sort of economy. Obviously, these 
elements are fundamentally foreign to the classical conception of development. 
 
Such development, it may be argued, requires what the Scottish 
Enlightenment called a “commercial society.” Thus, real development requires a 
country to create market institutions and a market culture in which business 
firms may safely function as well as a supply of conventional infrastructure and 
public services. As a result, the classical perspective, to the extent it is 
influential, focuses reconstruction efforts on a woefully narrow sub-set of the 
pre-conditions needed for development to start or re-start. The baleful influence 
of classical thinking could be a large part of the explanation why economic 
assistance has not been directed toward the reactivation of legitimate business 
enterprise, with its attendant investment projects, job creation and increases in 
productivity – and why little progress toward these goals has been seen. 
 
Carrying out an effective reconstruction program to hasten the restart of 
such a rich development is a challenge, of course. There is no cookbook with 
recipes for all the institutions and cultures that serve to build an enterprising 
economy. In deciding on institutions and mores it will not do to look at other 
economies to infer what would work well or badly in a given country: copying 
institutions and cultures from countries at very different levels of development 
or different contexts is particularly risky. The idea of Rational Institutions – that 
a country can be depended on to choose the right institutions simply by virtue of 
its rationality and careful observation of other countries – is seriously  mistaken. 
As the Enlightenment’s David Hume would have said, choosing the right 
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institutions requires “imagination.” 
 
Besides its shortcomings, the classical doctrine is pernicious. It proscribes 
some kinds of programs that may be sorely needed. The idea promoted by some 
multilateral and bilateral donors that the war-torn countries can afford to follow 
laissez-faire policies – that in these countries unfettered markets work best and 
only the advanced countries need the paraphernalia of subsidies, licenses, 
regulations, corrective taxes, and so forth – is a costly ideology. 
 
In a war-torn country where the economy has been devastated and may not 
bear the fruits of centuries of experimentation and diversification, there may be 
a need for judicious and well-designed departures from laissez-faire – just as the 
United States in the early years of the republic adopted some of the infant 
industry ideas of Alexander Hamilton. Prohibitions against any and all 
interventions in the market place in a country whose institutions and culture 
have been destabilized seems dogmatic and unjudicious. 
 
In her insightful and timely book Rebuilding War-Torn States, Graciana 
del Castillo understands that reconstruction in the war-torn countries must aim 
toward a commercial society. She points to the failures of most of these 
countries, ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq and Kosovo, to create adequate job 
opportunities for the population, particularly for the younger population, which 
constitutes a large part of the labor force in these countries. Inclusion, 
integration, jobs and the dynamism that helps to realize these qualities: these 
ought to be the quest of the war-torn countries, del Castillo implies, just as they 
ought to be the quest of the economically advanced countries. 
 
A vicious circle has followed in the war-torn countries. Lack of productive 
alternatives has driven farmers in post-conflict countries to growing illicit crops 
and has led others in these countries to engage in all kinds of illegal activities. 
The resulting lack of adequate jobs has contributed to public insecurity; it has 
also been a major factor in the tendency of these countries to revert to war. 
These results have in turn weakened the already slender incentives to restart 
normal business activities in farms and towns. 
 
The author understands also that the nature of economic aid from the 
advanced economies of the West has much to do with the plight of the war-torn 
nations. She notes that there is no lack of western aid and assistance going to 
these countries. There has been humanitarian aid, which serves to support life 
and provide minimum levels of consumption. But it does nothing to promote the 
survivors’ development. There has also been much “reconstruction aid” 
channeled with the aim of creating conditions for subsequent redevelopment. 
But there are evidently deficiencies of understanding – and misunderstandings – 
of what reconstruction must do in these war-torn countries. Reconstruction aid 
has not been directed toward the reactivation of legitimate business enterprise 
and thus creation of jobs and increases in productivity. 
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The author understands too that some departures from laissez-faire are 
acutely needed in the war-torn nations. On the evidence of these countries, del 
Castillo argues that effective reconstruction, besides establishing the usual pre-
conditions for development, needs to carry out a number of activities to 
reintegrate into the productive activities of the business sector an array of 
former combatants, returnees, displaced persons and other groups dislocated by 
the conflict. The economic, financial, and operational challenges of carrying out 
those activities are particularly difficult amid the democratization and the 
institution of the rule of law that must take place simultaneously and that 
impose a variety of constraints on reconstruction. 
 
The book recognizes that one of the challenges of reconstruction is the 
difficulty of reactivating investment in the presence of uncertainty about 
property rights. Such uncertainty is always present in countries coming out of 
war where governments may lack legitimacy to solve long-standing conflicts 
with regard to property rights, or to establish property rights going forward, 
since investors will fear that these may change as a legitimate government takes 
over. At the same time, establishing law and order is particularly difficult in 
these countries where “spoilers,” who benefited from illicit activities during the 
war, make every possible effort to restore unlawfulness. 
 
Based on case studies and other relevant experiences, the author presents 
the basic premises, lessons, best practices and policy guidelines which she 
posits are necessary to design an effective strategy for post-conflict economic 
reconstruction. In her view, unless jobs are created and the political and security 
objectives are assured, rebuilding war-torn states will not succeed and peace 











by Edmund S. Phelps8 
 
The great economic theorist at Chicago, Frank Knight, observing American 
business experience, took the unprecedented position in his 1921 classic Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit that most business decisions, especially strategic ones, are 
to varying degree steps into the unknown. Each of the possible outcomes of a 
business venture can be considered to have some probability of occurring, but 
those probabilities are not known to the players. Thus was born the concept of 
Knightian uncertainty. The great theorist at Cambridge and Knight’s 
contemporary, John Maynard Keynes, produced major ideas on the consequences 
of this uncertainty in his 1921 book Essay on Probability and his 1936 book The 
General Theory. 
 
Knightian uncertainty does not stem from some failure to study on the part 
of decision makers. Rather, it results from the unknowability of some of the 
conditions, present and future, on which the consequences of the decisions 
depend. If gamblers keep betting heads or tails, the evolving holdings may be 
knowable in a probabilistic sort of way. In the world of Knight and Keynes, 
though, the economic future is, in large part, not even probabilistic—it is to an 
important degree indeterminate. And if the probabilities governing the future 
cannot be known to a participant, they cannot be known to an outside observer or 
theorist, either. The driver in Keynes’s “general theory” is entrepreneurs’ intuition 
about the profitability of investments they contemplate; with their limited 
understanding, his entrepreneurs can have little idea what the correct expectation 
of profitability would be.   
 
The heightened uncertainty and indeterminacy in economic life that 
Knight and Keynes captured came with the rise of the modern economy in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. The arrival of finance capitalism, with its 
restless experimentalism, created economies of dynamism—economies with a 
propensity to innovate in ways that prove viable. It is this new dynamism that 
radically increased the unknowability that the actors in these economies had to 
confront. Dynamism—and the accompanying uncertainty and indeterminacy were 
virtually unheard of in the so-called traditional economies of the eighteenth 
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century, in those economies, uncertainties seldom intruded except in the case of 
exogenous forces—the occasional scientific discovery, a natural disaster, and so 
forth. In contrast, in the modern economies that followed, new commercial 
ideas—thus elements of unknowability and uncertainty were generated by the 
operation of economies themselves. From time to time some businessperson, 
observing current practice first hand, would hit upon an original idea for a better 
way to do things. First in Britain, then on a wider scale and with greater force in 
Germany, and later the United States, finance capitalism generated a torrent of 
endogenous innovations from the 1860s onward for decades—a torrent that in the 
United States stretched through the 1930s and has had significant recurrences 
since. 
 
This economic dynamism, though not measured directly, is manifest in 
several ways. It injects new kinds of activity into business life: employment in the 
financing, development, and marketing of new commercial products for launch 
into the marketplace and a cadre of managers deciding what to produce and how 
to produce it. It appears to lift job satisfaction and employee engagement. It 
increases turnover in the ranks of the economy’s largest firms, as some new firms 
grow large and displace old firms. Last but not least, it lifts productivity onto a 
higher (whether or not a faster growing) path. It must be emphasized that rapid 
growth for a time is not evidence of much or any dynamism; and slow growth for 
a time is not evidence of a lack of it: Dynamism and growth are not synonymous. 
 
The importance of dynamism in understanding and appreciating the 
standout economies—going back more than a century—is no secret among 
economists and business historians. It has been present for years in the pages of 
Friedrich Hayek, Alfred Chandler, Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, Roman 
Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynsky, Amar Bhide, Virginia Postrel, and some 
work of mine. Yet the general public has been led to believe the myth that high 
productivity, wages, and wealth are driven by the great technological advances of 
unworldly scientists operating outside the nation’s economy: Columbus, 
Magellan, Watt, Volta, Faraday, Marconi, von Neumann, Berners-Lee, and the 
rest. It has to be added that large numbers of economists find it inconvenient to 
recognize originality and novelty in their formal economic models. Empirically, 
however, we do not find that productivity growth arrives in great waves, each 
linked to a scientific breakthrough. Furthermore, looking across countries, we do 
not see the patterns that the popular myth would predict: There are wide gaps in 
productivity levels and in some of the other manifestations of dynamism. It is 
clear that, in many countries though not all, something big is going on besides 
science—namely, ideas for new commercial products and new ways to produce. 
 
Historically, capitalism—despite its many imperfections and episodic 
malfunctions—has proved the premiere economic system for dynamism. 
Capitalism is all about commercial innovation – the birth of the idea, the 
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development and marketing, and the adoption. Once key freedoms, supporting 
institutions and favorable attitudes have evolved, some participants step forward 
with entrepreneurial proposals, others step into roles as lenders or investors to 
finance some of these projects, still others, as managers or consumers, evaluate 
and sometimes make pioneering adoptions of the new products.  
 
Of course, the uncertainty and the learning costs entailed by economic 
dynamism make business life treacherous, though exciting and challenging. There 
are hazards in acting without allowance for one’s limited understanding. 
Unfortunately, it has become the style in business decision making to pretend that 
the economy and the financial markets are well understood and that the pertinent 
numerical parameters of financial and economic models, including the relevant 
probabilities, are fully known (or close enough to it). The misadventures of recent 
times—the monetary policy blunders, regulatory mistakes, astonishing financial 
losses, and worldwide systemic financial crises—are dramatic evidence to the 
contrary. 
 
The recent problems in the banking sector in the United States are 
indicative of some of the failures. While many believed for some time that 
subprime lending and securitization would enable more people to own homes, 
decision makers had no foundation on which to estimate either the valuations or 
the risks of the novel assets acquired. Mistakenly, many thought that portfolio 
diversification could eliminate Knightian uncertainty as well as other risks. 
Furthermore, models did not allow for macroeconomic swings and for the 
unknown numbers of new financial companies that might enter the business. The 
irony here was that the financial sector, in the practices it introduced to capture 
what it thought were opportunities for a pure profit, ended up creating new and 
colossal uncertainties for itself and the global economy. 
 
Capitalism has thus been disgraced precisely in the area of its greatest 
competence. The relatively capitalist economies, notwithstanding the considerable 
dynamism that classic capitalism showed in its glorious past—the knack for 
efficient and profitable innovation—have betrayed a lack of awareness and 
sophistication about what is required for making successful decisions of an 
innovative nature. Yet we can hope to find in the faults of standard practice and 
governance some ways to reorient the financial sector toward business 
development and commercial innovation – with resulting dividends in increased 
dynamism in the economy. As I have argued for some time, an economically 
advanced country is not doing justice to the potentialities of the population for 
self-actualization and self-discovery if it does not examine institutions, attitudes 
and beliefs for ways to shore up its dynamism. 
 
 16
This original and provocative book by Leo Tilman therefore comes in our 
hour of need. It starts off by making sense of the tectonic shifts that occurred in 
finance over the past quarter century. It then proceeds to offer a decision-making 
framework for operating in the new financial world. Tilman argues that the 
mechanism of how economic value is created (and destroyed) in finance is central 
to understanding modern financial institutions and capital markets. Equally 
intriguingly, he proposes that it is the dynamism of financial institutions’ risk-
taking and business decisions that both distinguishes the modern financial world 
from prior financial regimes and serves as the main determinant of their success 
going forward. He calls this evolutionary thesis Dynamic Finance. 
 
This thesis contrasts the brave new world of finance with the old regime of 
the post-WW II economy. In the past, Tilman argues, financial institutions used to 
fulfill their chartered roles in ways that, from the risk-management perspective, 
were very traditional and static. Measures of economic success based on 
accounting earnings and standard financial disclosures may have been the 
adequate lens through which to view reality in the good-old days of the banker 
George Bailey in Frank Capra’s It’s a Wonderful Life, to borrow the author’s apt 
image. However, they are not applicable to the new dynamic state of affairs and 
thus often lead to confusion and inoptimal decisions. This depiction reminded me 
of the “traditional economy”—the economy of routine captured by the 
neoclassical models of economic equilibrium: they excluded change for which 
there was no prior information and departures for which there was no known 
knowledge to go by. 
 
The modern economy opens the door for individuals to exercise their 
creativity by venturing to do something innovative—financing, developing, and 
marketing of new products and methods. Models of such an economy must 
recognize the nonroutine ways in which market participants make decisions or 
deploy resources. These models must also be general enough to be compatible 
with the myriad of ways in which market participants might revise their views of 
the future and act on them. In applying a similar line of thinking to financial 
institutions, Tilman develops a concept of risk-based economic performance that 
underlies the book’s evolutionary thesis and leads to a decision-making 
framework that he calls Financial Darwinism. This book introduces a new 
intellectual paradigm that can be used to guide strategic and investment decisions. 
Importantly, however, by recognizing the essence of dynamism, it does not 
impose the author’s views or advocate any particular paths to success, leaving it 
to financial executives to use their creativity, proprietary knowledge, and 
ingenuity when ultimately deciding what is best for their firms. 
 
This brings me back to the interaction of uncertainty and dynamism. 
Given that nonroutine business decisions are steps into the unknown, I have 
always found it odd that financial executives seemed to think so little about 
 17
Knightian uncertainty. Tilman does not view this lack of concern as surprising at 
all, attributing it to old mental paradigms and static business models that obscured 
the roles of risk taking and uncertainty during the old financial regime. He argues 
that, as a result of the tectonic financial shift, active risk taking has become a 
much greater contributor to economic value creation, and, therefore, the role of 
risk in the lives of financial institutions must be made explicit. Tilman points out 
that the greater complexity of today’s financial world stems from more dynamic 
economies, more dynamic financial institutions, greater connectivity of the capital 
markets, and a set of other powerful secular forces. Therefore, the nature of 
executives’ strategic vision and their understanding of uncertainty must change 
accordingly. 
 
The book’s author and I first met at the World Economic Forum in Davos 
and have since continued our discussion of economic dynamism and the attendant 
uncertainties at Columbia’s Center on Capitalism and Society. We are in 
agreement that dynamism, though messy and the cause of some volatility and 
irremediable inequalities, is important not only for its effects on productivity and 
employment—which serve in turn to increase the inclusion of people into the 
commercial economy—but also for itself. An economy of dynamism meets some 
of our very basic needs: to exercise our imaginations, to enjoy the mental stimulus 
of change, to have an endless series of new problems to solve, to expand our 
capabilities, to feel the thrill of discovery, and to sense our personal growth. From 
the start, Tilman and I were intrigued by the many parallels between economic 
dynamism and the dynamism in finance.  He sees the latter as essential for 
modern financial institutions’ survival and success. 
 
I believe this thought-provoking book, in interpreting major financial 
trends, in pointing to the need for financial dynamism, and in providing the 
relevant arsenal of ideas and decision-making tools to that end, will be of great 
interest to executives, investors, regulators, academics, and students of economics 
and finance. Let us hope that the banking industry will be given the opportunity to 
reform itself – to acquire the strategic vision and management practice that will 
create real and lasting economic value, thus benefiting shareowners, employees, 
indeed, the whole society. 
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